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Abstract
We develop efficient algorithms to construct utility maximizing mechanisms in the presence
of risk averse players (buyers and sellers) in Bayesian single parameter and multi-parameter
settings. We model risk aversion by a concave utility function, and players play strategically to
maximize their expected utility. Bayesian mechanism design has usually focused on maximizing
expected revenue in a risk neutral environment, i.e. where all the buyers and the seller have
linear utility, and no succinct characterization of expected utility maximizing mechanisms is
known even for single-parameter multi-unit auctions.
We first consider the problem of designing optimal DSIC (dominant strategy incentive com-
patible) mechanism for a risk averse seller in the case of multi-unit auctions, and we give a
poly-time computable deterministic sequential posted pricing mechanism (SPM) that for any
ǫ > 0, yields a (1 − 1/e − ǫ)-approximation to the expected utility of the seller in an optimal
DSIC mechanism. Our result is based on a novel application of a correlation gap bound, along
with splitting and merging of random variables to redistribute probability mass across buyers.
This allows us to reduce our problem to that of checking feasibility of a small number of distinct
configurations, each of which corresponds to a covering LP. A feasible solution to the LP gives
us the distribution on prices for each buyer to use in a randomized SPM. We get a deterministic
SPM by sampling from this randomized SPM. Our techniques extend to the multi-parameter
setting with unit demand buyers.
We next consider the setting when buyers as well as the seller are risk averse, and the
objective is to maximize the seller’s expected utility. We design a truthful-in-expectation mech-
anism whose utility is a
((
1− 1
e
)2
×max
(
1− 1
e
, 1− 1√
2pik
))
-approximation to the optimal BIC
mechanism under two mild assumptions: (a) ex post individual rationality and (b) no positive
transfers. Our mechanism consists of multiple rounds. It considers each buyer in a round with
small probability, and when a buyer is considered, it allocates an item to the buyer according
to payment functions that are computed using stochastic techniques developed for DSIC mech-
anisms. Lastly, we consider the problem of revenue maximization for a risk neutral seller in
presence of risk averse buyers, and give a poly-time algorithm to design an optimal mechanism
for the seller.
We believe that the techniques developed in this work will be useful in handling other
stochastic optimization problems with a concave objective function.
1 Introduction
Bayesian mechanism design has usually focused on maximizing expected revenue in a risk neutral
environment, i.e. where all the buyers and the seller have linear utility, and choose their strategy
with the aim of maximizing their expected payoff. However, since the payoff is a random outcome
that depends on other players’ valuations and strategies, there is risk associated with it. A standard
model [4, 13] that captures risk aversion assumes that a player has a non-decreasing concave utility
function U : (−∞,∞) → (−∞,∞), so that when the payoff obtained is R, the player’s utility is
U(R). The player may choose to express various levels of risk aversion by specifying a suitable
concave function as his utility, and then his aim becomes to maximize his expected utility. While
mechanism design in a risk neutral (linear utility) environment is well understood for multi-unit
auctions, many properties tend to break down in the presence of risk aversion (concave utility). In
this paper, we develop efficient algorithms to compute mechanisms in the presence of risk averse
players. We mainly focus on the prominent single parameter setting of multi-unit auctions.
Risk neutral Seller, Risk Averse Buyers: Let us first analyze the effect of risk aversion among
buyers when the seller is risk neutral, i.e. he wants to maximize his expected revenue. This has been
the predominant model for studying risk aversion in mechanism design. Myerson’s characterization
[12] of the optimal auction design does not apply when buyers are risk averse. In particular, revenue
equivalence [12] does not hold, and an optimal dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC)
mechanism may generate less expected revenue than an optimal Bayesian incentive compatible
(BIC) mechanism. This is because when buyers are risk averse, the seller can extract greater
expected revenue by offering a deterministic payment scheme to the buyers and charging extra for
this insurance. As a specific example, consider buyers with constant absolute risk aversion, i.e.
exponentially diminishing marginal utility. For any DSIC mechanism (such as Myerson’s), one can
construct a corresponding BIC mechanism with the same allocation curves: if a buyer i reports
valuation v, charge a deterministic payment α(i, v) (perhaps zero) if the buyer does not get the
item, and β(i, v) if he gets the item. For the latter mechanism to be truthful, it must satisfy utility
equivalence [10, 11, 8]: the net expected utility of the buyer in the latter mechanism must match the
former when his value is v, for each v. However, if his expected payment in the latter mechanism
remains equal to the former, then his net expected utility will go up, because concave utility makes
the deterministic payment more preferable. Thus the expected payment must be higher in the latter
mechanism, implying greater revenue. Note that the direct revelation principle still holds, so there
is a BIC mechanism that generates as much expected revenue as any Bayes-Nash equilibriuma.
Maskin and Riley [9] characterized optimal BIC mechanism in this setting for selling a single item
when buyers’ value distributions are IID. It is assumed that the buyers’ utility functions are known
to the mechanism designer (the seller), since truthfulness itself depends on these functions. Another
well-known result states that under some natural assumptions on the buyers’ utility functions, first-
price auction with reserve (specifically, Bayes-Nash equilibrium of this auction) generates greater
revenue than second-price auction with the same reserve [10, 9, 11]. These results show that the
presence of risk averse buyers should have substantial effect on optimal mechanism design.
Our results for a k-unit auction are summarized in Table 1. We first design a poly-time algorithm
to compute a BIC mechanism for a risk neutral seller when buyers are risk averse with publicly
known utility functions. This result extends the work of Maskin and Riley [9], in a computational
sense, to the general setting of multi-unit auctions with non-identical distributions. Our algorithm is
aAny equilibrium of the mechanism where buyers play strategically to maximize their utility.
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Type of risk
environment
Comparison with Optimal DSIC Comparison with Optimal BIC
Poly-time DSIC a Poly-time TIE b Poly-time BIC b
Risk neutral seller,
risk neutral buyers
1 [Myerson ’81] 1
[Myerson ’81]
1 [Myerson ’81]
Risk neutral seller,
risk averse buyers
1 [Myerson ’81] γ(k) c
[Theorem 4]
1 [Theorem 4]
Risk averse seller,
risk neutral buyers
(1− 1/e− ǫ) [Theorem 1] (1−1/e)2γ(k)−ǫ
[Theorem 2]d
1 [Eso-Futo ’99]
Risk averse seller,
risk averse buyers
(1− 1/e− ǫ) [Theorem 1] (1−1/e)2γ(k)−ǫ
[Theorem 2]d
(1−1/e)2γ(k)− ǫ
[Theorem 2]d
aNeed to know seller’s utility function. Independent of buyers’ utility functions as long as they are non-decreasing.
bNeed to know both seller and buyers’ utility functions.
cγ(k) = (1− k
k
k!ek
). γ(1) = 1− 1/e, and it approaches (1− 1√
2pik
) for large k.
dImproves to (1−1/e)γ(k)−ǫ for IID buyers (Theorem 3). Further, the factor improves to (1−1/e−ǫ) if k ≥ 1/ǫ3.
Here, comparison is made only against optimal BIC satisfying: (i) ex-post IR, and (ii) no positive transfers.
Table 1: Summary of approximation results for k-unit auctions.
a linear program developed using a general form of Border’s inequality. Further, we design a a poly-
time computable randomized truthful-in-expectation mechanism which is a γ(k)-approximation to
the utility optimal BIC mechanism. Here, γ(k) = (1 − k
k
k!ek
); γ(1) = 1− 1/e, and approaches (1−
1√
2πk
) for large k. A mechanism is said to be truthful in expectation (TIE) if truth-telling maximizes
each buyer’s expected utility, regardless of other buyers’ bids (expected utility is measured only
over the random bits used by the mechanism). This is a stronger truthfulness requirement than
BIC, but weaker than DSIC b, and does not rely on all buyers sharing the same belief about each
other. TIE mechanisms can still generate greater expected revenue than DSIC mechanisms. In
effect, this result bounds the gap between TIE mechanisms and BIC mechanisms.
Risk Averse Seller, Risk Averse Buyers: Next, we consider the scenario where the seller as
well as the buyers are risk averse. Risk aversion from a seller’s perspective has received relatively
less attention, and no work has considered both sides to be risk averse. Eso and Futo [7] designed
an optimal BIC mechanism for a risk averse seller when buyers are risk neutral. In this setting,
the seller can transfer the entire risk to risk neutral buyers, and obtain the expected revenue of
Myerson’s mechanism in every realization. A DSIC mechanism cannot do such a risk transfer,
and as such, the gap between optimal BIC and optimal DSIC is unbounded, as illustrated below.
Example. Consider an instance with two buyers and two items. Each buyer has valuation 1 for the
item w.p. ǫ and 0 otherwise. The seller’s utility function U is as follows: U(t) = min{t, ǫ}. The
utility optimal DSIC mechanism sets a price of 1 to each buyer, and gets utility ǫ with probability
2ǫ(1 − ǫ) ≤ 2ǫ, otherwise its utility is 0. So the expected utility of an optimal DSIC mechanism
is at most 2ǫ2. If the first buyer is risk neutral, then we can design a BIC mechanism as follows:
charge the first buyer ǫ in every realization (even when his value is zero), and set a price of 1 to the
second buyer. If the second buyer pays up 1 (which happens w.p. ǫ), then pay 1 dollar to the first
buyer. The first buyer never gets the item, and the mechanism is incentive compatible for the first
bIn this paper, we require that in a DSIC mechanism, truth-telling must maximize buyers’ utility regardless of the
mechanism’s random bits. This distinction between DSIC and TIE will play a crucial role below.
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buyer. The seller gets a revenue of ǫ in every realization, so his expected utility is ǫ. Therefore the
gap is unbounded as ǫ→ 0.
However, the extent to which the seller can transfer its risk to the buyers depends upon buyers’
utility functions. So the result of [7] does not hold when buyers are risk averse. We design TIE
mechanisms that are constant approximation to a utility-optimal BIC mechanism for a risk averse
seller. We restrict our comparison only to BIC mechanisms that do not allow positive transfers (i.e.
there is no payment from the seller to any buyer in any realization), and are ex post individually
rational. Our approximation factor is (1−1/e)2γ(k) ((1−1/e)γ(k) for IID buyers), and approaches
(1 − 1/e) (using a slightly different algorithm) as k becomes large. This implies a constant upper
bound on the gap between TIE mechanisms and BIC mechanisms without positive transfer.
DSIC mechanisms for Risk Averse Sellers: So far, we have designed BIC or TIE mechanisms
assuming that the players’ utility functions are known to the designer. Though this has been a
standard assumption through most of the literature on risk aversion, it is usually the seller who
designs the mechanism, and it is not practical to assume that the seller knows all the buyers’ utility
functions. Unfortunately, it is impossible in general to even check if a mechanism is BIC or even
TIE (or identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of a given mechanism) without knowing the buyers’
utility functions. In contrast, DSIC mechanisms are independent of buyers’ utility functions as
long as buyers’ utility functions are non-decreasing. So we do not need to know the buyers’ utility
functions to compute a utility-optimal DSIC mechanism for the seller.
Clearly, for a risk-neutral seller, Myerson’s mechanism remains an optimal DSIC mechanism
even when buyers are risk averse. However, that is not true for a risk averse seller. Further,
a virtual value maximization approach does not apply when the seller has at least two units of
inventoryc. This is because the contributions of different buyers cannot be counted separately
when the seller has non-linear utility. We design a poly-time computable (1−1/e− ǫ)-approximate
DSIC mechanism. Our mechanism is a sequential posted-pricing mechanism (SPM), that decides
a price for each buyer, and then makes take-it-or-leave it offers to the buyers in decreasing order
of prices, till inventory runs out. Posted pricing mechanisms have been studied extensively for
maximizing expected revenue (eg. [6, 5, 16]).
Sundarajan and Yan [14] designed DSIC mechanisms for multi-unit auctions for a risk-averse
seller when buyers’ valuation functions are regular. They focused only on mechanisms that do not
depend even on the seller’s own utility function. While this may be an attractive property, the
optimal mechanism is no longer well-defined in this case (even neglecting computational limita-
tions), and it forces the approximation guarantees to be weaker – 1/8-approximation for regular
distributions (1/2 when there is unlimited supply of items), and there is a lower bound instance
implying unbounded gap for general distributions. Non-regular distributions are not uncommon –
any distribution with more than one mode is non-regular. Risk aversion is particularly important
in the presence of such high variance distributions, and it is a reasonable approach for a seller to
decide upon his own utility function and then use our algorithm to design a mechanism.
As a final note, we are able to extend our techniques to give a constant approximation to
an optimal deterministic DSIC mechanism in a multi-parameter setting, namely, when there are
multiple distinct items and unit-demand buyers (see Appendix E).
cIf there is only one item to sale, then at most one buyer pays in any realization, and the seller’s utility can be
maximized by scaling the bid values using the utility function.
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1.1 Overview of Techniques
We first design a DSIC mechanism for a risk averse seller, which turns out to be a relatively simpler
problem than competing against optimal BIC mechanism. We establish our main probabilistic
tools in the process, which later get used for our BIC results. For DSIC mechanisms, we first
argue that a (1 − 1e )-approximate (randomized) SPM can be obtained by using the same price
distribution as that offered to each buyer in the optimal mechanism, except that the prices are now
set independently (see Lemma 3.3). The argument uses the correlation gap bound of Agrawal et.
al. [1] for submodular objectives. However, this is only an existential result, since getting the SPM
requires oracle access to a utility-optimal DSIC mechanism.
Our main technical contribution is to show that it suffices (with same loss factor of (1−1/e)) to
match the optimal mechanism only in the sum of sale probabilities over all buyers, and not the sale
probability for each buyer, at every price. That is, any two mechanisms that match in this coarse
footprint will have approximately equal expected utility. This property follows from a generalization
of the correlation gap bound in [1], which not only introduces independence but also redistributes
probability mass across variables (see Lemma 3.7). The redistribution is achieved by splitting and
merging random variables to transform one given mechanism to another that matches the coarse
footprint. Using a sophisticated classification of prices, we show that it suffices to match an even
coarser footprint containing only constant number of parameters, which define a configuration. The
algorithm finds a feasible solution for each configuration using a covering LP. Then, it simulates
these SPMs, one for each feasible configuration, to choose one with the highest expected utility.
To design a BIC mechanism when the seller as well as the buyers are risk averse, the techniques
developed for DSIC mechanisms can be used to establish that if allocation and payment functions
of the optimal mechanism across buyers are made independent, and inventory constraints removed,
the utility will be at least (1 − 1/e)OPTBIC. However, to convert such a soft mechanism into a
mechanism that strictly satisfies the inventory constraint is not easy: if we restrict the allocation to
buyers with top k payments in a realization of a soft mechanism, a function which is submodular,
the resulting mechanism is no longer BIC. Further, distributions on the revenue from any two
allocations in the mechanism are incomparable, so restricting to first k allocations in a realization
of a soft mechanism can be arbitrarily bad. To overcome this problem, we develop a mechanism with
L→∞ rounds, such that in each round, each buyer is ignored with a high probability of (1−1/L).
We show that the revenue from each allocation in this mechanism has identical distribution, and
the loss in the expected utility caused by imposing the hard inventory constraint is bounded.
Organization: Rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide some back-
ground material. In Sections 3 and 4, we present our DSIC and BIC mechanisms for risk averse
seller, respectively. Our BIC mechanisms for the risk neutral seller and risk averse buyers appear
in Appendix D, and our result for multi-parameter unit-demand setting appears in Appendix E.
2 Preliminaries
Single Parameter Multi-Unit Auctions: The seller provides a single type of item (or service),
of which he has k identical copies. There are n buyers {1, 2, . . . n}, who have some private value
for that service. Let buyer i have a valuation of vi for the item (and he can consume only one
unit), which is drawn, independent of other buyers’ valuations, from a known distribution with cdf
Fi(x) = Pr [vi ≤ x]. We refer to v = (v1,v2 . . . vn) as the valuation vector.
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Revenue, Utility and Optimality: The revenue Rev(M,v) of a mechanism M, when the
realized valuation vector is v, is the sum of payments from each buyers. The expected revenue of a
mechanismRev(M) is Ev[Rev(M,v)]. In this work, we assume that the seller has a monotonically
increasing concave utility function U, which also satisfies U(0) = 0. The utility of the mechanism
is U(Rev(M,v)), and the expected utility of the mechanism is U(M) = Ev[U(Rev(M,v))]. Let
OPTDSIC and OPTBIC denote the expected utility of a utility-optimal DSIC and BIC mechanisms
respectively. A mechanism is said to be an α-approximation to optimal DSIC (or BIC) mechanism
if U(M) ≥ αOPTDSIC (or U(M) ≥ αOPTBIC).
DSIC Mechanisms: It is well-known (eg. [12]) that a DSIC mechanism sets a (possibly ran-
domized) price for buyer i based on v−i but independent of vi, and buyer i gets an item if and
only if his valuation exceeds this price. Given this characterization, it is easy to see that as long
as a buyer has a non-decreasing utility function, he will report truthfully in a DSIC mechanism,
for any realization of valuation vector and random bits of the mechanism. Note that random bits
do not help a DSIC mechanism obtain greater utility, since the definition of DSIC implies that
truthfulness must hold even if the random bits were revealed prior to submitting bids. So there is
a utility-optimal DSIC mechanism which is deterministic.
Buyer’s Risk Aversion and BIC Mechanisms: Each buyer i is associated with a publicly
known monotone concave utility function Ui (defined on the value of item received minus payment)
with Ui(0) = 0. A BIC mechanism is associated with two functions h(·, ·, ·) and g(·, ·, ·): h(i, j, v) is
the probability that for valuation v, buyer i is allocated an item for a payment of pj, and g(i, j, v) is
the probability that he pays pj and is not allocated an item for valuation v. We refer to these two
functions as the payment functions of the mechanism. We note that the allocation and payment of
a buyer is possibly correlated with other buyers’ payments, allocations as well as their valuations.
Thus, a mechanism is BIC if and only if for each i, v, v′, we have∑
j (Ui(v − pj)h(i, j, v) + Ui(−pj)g(i, j, v)) ≥
∑
j (Ui(v − pj)h(i, j, v
′) + Ui(−pj)g(i, j, v′))
We note, given any buyer i, we allow his payment to be randomized rather than a fixed value as
a function of buyer i’s valuation and whether he gets an item. This strictly gives more power to a
risk averse seller maximizing his expected utility. This is in contrast to the setting considered by
Maskin and Riley [9], where it suffices to assume that buyer i’s payment for valuation v is a fixed
value as a function of v and whether he gets the item.
We define a soft randomized sequential mechanism as a mechanism without inventory limit that
arranges buyers in an arbitrary order, asks each buyer for his valuation one-by-one. If the buyer i’s
reported valuation is v, the mechanism allocates an item to him independently w.p.
∑
j h(i, j, v).
If he is allocated an item, then the seller charges him pj w.p.
h(i,j,v)∑
l h(i,l,v)
. When he is not allocated
an item, he pays pj w.p.
g(i,j,v)∑
l g(i,l,v)
. Randomized sequential mechanisms are same as soft randomized
sequential mechanisms with an exception that they stop after running out of inventory. We note
that if a soft randomized sequential mechanism is BIC, then the corresponding randomized sequential
mechanism is also BIC.
Stochastic Dominance: Given two non-negative distributionsD1 andD2, we say D1 stochastically
dominates D2, denoted by D1  D2, if ∀a ≥ 0, PrX:D1(X1 ≥ a) ≥ PrX:D2(X1 ≥ a). We note an
important property of concave functions in the following lemma.
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Lemma 2.1 Given any non-decreasing concave function U, and three independent non-negative
random variables X,Y1, Y2, let D1 and D2 be the distributions of Y1 and Y2 respectively. If D1  D2,
then EX,Y1:D1 [U(X + Y )−U(Y )] ≤ EX,Y1:D2 [U(X + Y )−U(Y )].
3 Risk Averse Seller: DSIC Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Auctions
In this section, we construct DSIC mechanisms for a risk averse seller. The following theorem
summarizes our result.
Theorem 1 For multi-unit auctions, there is a poly-time computable deterministic SPM with ex-
pected utility at least (1− 1e − ǫ)OPT, for any ǫ > 0, where OPT is the expected utility of an optimal
DSIC mechanism.
We first prove the existence of an SPM that achieves a (1 − 1/e)-approximation to the optimal
expected utility (Section 3.1), however this result is not constructible and does not lead to an
efficient implementation. We then identify a set of sufficient properties of (1−1/e− ǫ)-approximate
mechanisms that enables us to construct a poly-time algorithm (Section 3.2).
3.1 Existence of a (1− 1/e)-approximate SPM
Given a set S = {x1, x2 . . . xn} of non-negative real number, let maxi{x1, x2 . . . xn} denote the i
th
largest value in the set, and let it be zero if i > n. Let Uk : R
n → R be the function defined as
Uk(S) = Uk(x1, x2 . . . xn) = U(
∑k
i=1maxi{x1, x2 . . . xn}), i.e. utility of the sum of the k largest
arguments. Let U(S) denote U∞(S) = U|S|(S), the utility of the sum of all variables. We note an
important property of Uk in the following lemma; its proof is deferred to the appendix.
Lemma 3.1 For any concave utility function U, and any k and n, the function Uk : R
n → R is
a symmetric, monotone and submodular.
We shall use the following correlation gap bound established by Agrawal et. al. [1] for monotone
submodular functions.
Lemma 3.2 [1] Given n non-negative random variables X1,X2, ...,Xn with distributions D1,D2, ...,Dn,
let D be an arbitrary joint distribution over these n random variables such that the marginal distri-
bution for each Xi remains unchanged. Let Dind be the joint distribution where each Xi is sampled
from Di independent of X−i. Then for any monotone submodular function f over X1,X2, ...,Xn,
we have
EX∼Dindf(X)
EX∼Df(X)
≥ 1− 1/e.
Let MOPT be a utility optimal DSIC mechanism for a k-unit auction. It follows that in MOPT,
every buyer i is offered a (random) price Pi as a function of other buyers’ bids; he receives an item
and pays the offered price if and only if his value exceeds the price. The following lemma uses the
correlation gap to establish the existence of an SPM which is a (1− 1/e)-approximation toMOPT.
Lemma 3.3 Suppose that MOPT offers a (random) price Pi to each buyer i (the prices Pi, 1 ≤
i ≤ n, may be correlated). Let M′ be a randomized SPM that selects an independent random price
P ′i for each buyer, such that P
′
i and Pi have the same marginal distribution, and offers items to
buyers in decreasing order of prices, until the items run out. Then U(M′) ≥ (1− 1/e)OPT.
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Proof: Let Ri be the payment obtained inMOPT from buyer i. Note that Pi and Ri are correlated
random variables that depend on the realization of the valuations, and Ri = Pi if vi > Pi, else
Ri = 0. As at most k buyers can make a positive payment in any realization of MOPT, we have
U(MOPT) = E [U(R1, R2 . . . Rn)] = E [Uk(R1, R2 . . . Rn)]
Let R′i = P
′
i if vi > P
′
i , else R
′
i = 0. Since the SPM M
′ orders buyers in decreasing order
of offer prices, so it collects the k largest acceptable prices as payment. We have U(M′) =
E [Uk(R
′
1, R
′
2 . . . R
′
n)]. Note that Ri and R
′
i have the same distribution for each i, except that
R1, R2 . . . Rn are correlated variables, while R
′
1, R
′
2 . . . R
′
n are mutually independent. Using the
submodularity of Uk (Lemma 3.1) and the correlation gap (Lemma 3.2), we get
U(M′) = E
[
Uk(R
′
1, R
′
2 . . . R
′
n)
]
≥ (1− 1/e)E [Uk(R1, R2 . . . Rn)] = (1− 1/e)U(MOPT)
This completes the proof.
Correlation gap was used by Yan [16] to show the same approximation ratio for an SPM to
expected revenue maximization. However, for revenue maximization, it suffices for the SPM to
match a revenue-optimal mechanism only in the probability of sale to each buyer, which solely
determines the buyer’s contribution to expected revenue. In contrast, for the utility maximization
result of Lemma 3.3, the SPM should match a utility-optimal mechanism in the entire distribution
of prices to each buyer. Also, the SPM for revenue maximization is poly-time computable, since a
revenue-optimal mechanism is known (Myerson’s mechanism). To the best of our knowledge, the
SPM designed in Lemma 3.3 is not poly-time computable: constructing it would need an oracle
access to a utility-optimal mechanism. Further, as we have to match MOPT for each buyer-price
pair, guessing the entire price distribution would require time exponential in the number of buyers.
3.2 Algorithm to compute a (1− 1/e− ǫ)-approximate SPM
We now present a polynomial time algorithm to compute an SPM whose approximation guarantee
essentially matches the existential result above. To simplify the exposition of our algorithm, we
assume that prices offered by any truthful mechanism belong to some known set P = {p1, p2, . . .}
whose size is polynomial in n. Let πij be the probability that buyer i is offered price pj in MOPT.
We divide the prices in P into 3 classes, small, large and huge. Fix some 1 > ǫ > 0. Let Phg
be the set of huge prices defined as pj ≥ U
−1(OPT/ǫ). The distinction between small and large
prices depend more intricately on the optimal mechanism. Let p∗ be the largest price such that∑
U−1(OPT/ǫ)>pj≥p∗ qj ≥ 1/ǫ
4, i.e. the threshold where the total sale probability of all large prices
add up to at least 1/ǫ4. If such a threshold does not exist, then let p∗ = 0 (note that p∗ must be
zero if k < 1/ǫ4). Let Psm be all prices less than p
∗, so that Plg = {pj | U−1(OPT/ǫ) > pj ≥ p∗}.
In the following lemma, we present a key set of sufficient conditions for a (1−1/e−ǫ)-approximate
mechanism which forms the basis of our algorithm; we defer its proof to later in the section.
Lemma 3.4 Consider any SPM M′, that offers price pj to buyer i w.p. π′ij, such that (a)∑
i,pj∈Psm pjπ
′
ij(1 − Fi(pj)) =
∑
pj∈Psm pjqj, (b) for each pj ∈ Plg,
∑
i π
′
ij(1 − Fi(pj)) = qj, (c)∑
i,pj∈Phg U(pj)π
′
ij(1 − Fi(pj)) =
∑
pj∈Phg U(pj)qj and (d)
∑
i,pj∈P π
′
ij(1 − Fi(pj)) ≤ k. Then we
have U(M′) ≥ (1− 1e −O(ǫ))OPT.
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Lemma 3.4 states that instead of matching MOPT in the probability mass of each <buyer, large-
price> pair, it suffices to match the total probability mass at each large price, summed over all
buyers. Thus the probability mass can be redistributed across buyers without much loss in utility.
Further, Lemma 3.4 effectively states that the contribution of the small prices and the large
prices can be linearized. Intuitively, if the small prices make a significant contribution to utility,
then the mechanism must be collecting many small prices, so the total revenue from small prices
exhibits a concentration around its expectation. Moreover, whenever a huge price is obtained in a
realization, we can neglect the contribution from all other buyers in that realization, without losing
much of the expected utility. So the contribution of huge prices can be measured separately. This
separation of huge and small prices from large prices enables us to keep the number of distinct large
prices to at most a constant.
Algorithm: We give an outline of the algorithm; the details are provided in the appendix. From
Lemma 3.4, it suffices to matchMOPT in (a) the expected revenue from the small prices (R), (b) the
expected contribution to utility from the huge prices H, and (c) the total sale probability at each
large price (qj). The values of these parameters define a configuration, and we guess the value of
each parameter with appropriate discretization. The number of distinct configurations is bounded
by 2poly(1/ǫ). For each configuration, we check if there exists an SPM satisfying the configuration,
using the covering linear program (LP) below. In the LP, the variable xij denotes the probability
that buyer i is offered price pj. ∑
i (1− Fi(pj)) xij ≥ qj ∀pj ∈ Plg∑
i,pj∈Psm (1− Fi(pj)) pjxij ≥ R∑
i,pj∈Phg (1− Fi(pj))U(pj)xij ≥ H∑
i,j (1− Fi(pj)) xij ≤ k∑
j xij ≤ 1 ∀j
xij ∈ [0, 1] ∀i, j
Any feasible solution to this linear program gives a distribution of prices for each buyer, which
gives us an SPM that satisfies the guessed configuration. We iterate through all the configurations,
and pick the best among these SPMs. A deterministic SPM with desired utility guarantees can be
easily identified by sampling from this randomized SPM.
3.3 Proof of Lemma 3.4
We begin by introducing two operations on random variables, split and merge. Using these two
operations, we prove two key properties of random variables in Lemmas 3.7 and 3.8; Lemma 3.4
would follow as a corollary of these two lemmas.
Split and Merge Operations: We now define two operations, merge and split, on non-negative
random variables. In the merge operation, given a set S of independent non-negative random
variables, letXi,Xj be any two variables in S such that Pr [Xi 6= 0]+Pr [Xj 6= 0] ≤ 1, then variables
Xi,Xj are replaced by a new variable Y such that, for each p > 0, Pr [Y = p] = Pr [Xi = p] +
Pr [Xj = p] and Y is independent of other variables in S\{Xi,Xj}.
The split operation breaks a random variable into a set of independent variables. Formally, given
a set S of non-negative (possibly correlated) random variables, first the variables in S are made
mutually independent, and then each variable Xi ∈ S is split into an arbitrary pre-specified set of
independent random variables {Xi1,Xi2, ...,Xit} such that for each p > 0,
∑
1≤j≤tPr [Xij = p] =
8
Pr [Xi = p] and the sets of variables created are also made mutually independent. Intuitively, the
merge operation introduces negative correlation. Analogously, the split operation introduces inde-
pendence. In Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6, we establish useful properties of merge and the split operations
for a concave non-decreasing function; their proofs are deferred to the appendix.
Lemma 3.5 Let S be a set of independent non-negative random variables, Let X1,X2 ∈ S, and let
Y be the variable formed by merging X1 and X2. Then E [Uk(S)] ≤ E [Uk((S \ {X1,X2}) ∪ {Y })].
Lemma 3.6 Consider a sequence of split operations on a set S of arbitrarily correlated non-negative
random variables and let S′ be the set of independent random variables at the end of the split
operation. Then E [Uk(S
′)] ≥ (1− 1e )E [Uk(S)].
Using these two operations, we establish an important property in the following lemma, that not
only introduces independence across correlated random variables, but also allows to redistribute
the probability mass across variables.
Lemma 3.7 Given an arbitrarily correlated set S = {X1,X2, ...,Xn}of non-negative random vari-
ables, consider any set S′ = {X ′1,X
′
2,X
′
3, ...,X
′
m} of independent non-negative random variables,
such that for each value pj > 0, we have
∑
iPr [Xi = pj] =
∑
iPr [X
′
i = pj]. Then for any concave
function U and any k > 0, we have E [Uk(S
′)] ≥ (1− 1e )E [Uk(S)].
Proof: We perform the split operation on S to create a set Y = {Yijl} of variables as follows: for
each 1 ≤ i ≤ n and pj > 0, create L→∞ variables {Yijl|1 ≤ l ≤ L} where Yijl takes value pj w.p.
Pr[Xi=pj ]
L and 0 otherwise. Using Lemma 3.6, we get that E [Uk(Y )] ≥ (1−
1
e )E [Uk(S)]
Now we perform merge operation repeatedly on variables in Y to simulate variables in S′. The
condition in the lemma statement ensures that such merging is always possible, since L → ∞.
Then by Lemma 3.5, we get E [Uk(S
′)] ≥ E [Uk(Y )] ≥ (1− 1/e)E [Uk(S)].
The following lemma effectively states that, given a set of independent random variables, the
contribution to the utility of huge values can be separated, and for small values, the variables can
be replaced by their expectations; we defer its proof to the appendix.
Lemma 3.8 Given any ǫ > 0 and a set of independent non-negative random variables S =
{X1,X2,X3 . . .} such that Xi takes value pi w.p. πi and 0 otherwise, where p1 ≥ p2 ≥ p3 ≥ . . . ≥ 0.
Also, suppose that
∑
Xi∈S πi ≤ k. Let pˆ be a price that satisfies pˆ ≥ U
−1 (E [Uk(S)]/ǫ), and let p∗ be
any price such that
∑
pi∈[p∗,pˆ) πi >
1
ǫ4
(p∗ is 0, if no such price exists). Also, let Ssm = {Xi|pi < p∗},
Slg = {Xi|p
∗ ≤ pi < pˆ}, and Shg = {Xi|pi > p∗}. Then E [Uk(S)] is approximated to within a factor
of (1±O(ǫ)) by
∑
Xi∈Shg E [U(Xi)] +E
[
U
(
E [Ssm] +
∑
Xi∈Slg Xi
)]
.
Now we are ready to prove Lemma 3.4. The revenue from a buyer in a mechanism can be represented
by a random variable, possibly correlated with other buyers’ random variables. Let M′ be a
mechanism that matches MOPT on the total sale probability for each price, and its sale probability
for each <buyer, large-price> pair is same as M. Using Lemma 3.7, we get U(M′) ≥ (1 −
1/e)U(MOPT). As M and M
′ have (approximately) identical revenues from small prices and
utilities from huge prices, we can invoke Lemma 3.8 to establish that U(M) ≥ (1− ǫ)U(M′). This
completes the proof.
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4 Risk Averse Seller and Risk Averse Buyers: BIC Mechanisms
We design mechanisms when buyers as well as the seller are risk averse, and the seller’s objective
is to maximize his expected utility. We make two assumptions: (a) for any i, t < 0, Ui(0) = 0 and
Ui(t) = −∞; this implies that the mechanism is ex post individually rational, and the payment from
a buyer is 0 whenever he does not get the item, (b) we further restrict to the set of mechanisms
in which payments are always non-negative, i.e. there is no positive transfer from the seller to a
buyer. Consider any mechanism M that satisfies these assumptions, let g(·, ·, ·) and h(·, ·, ·) be its
payment functions. Then we have g(i, j, v) = 0 for each i, v and payment pj , and h(i, j, v) = 0 for
each i, v and payment pj < 0. Thus, the function g(·, ·, ·) is not required to describe the mechanism.
The following theorem summarizes our result.
Theorem 2 There exists a polynomial time algorithm to compute a truthful-in-expectation mecha-
nism for a k-unit auction with expected utility at least
(
1− 1e
)2
γ(k)OPT where OPT is the expected
utility of an optimal BIC mechanism. Moreover, for k ≥ 1/ǫ3, there is a
(
1− 1e − ǫ
)
-approximation.
Our result giving an improved approximation ratio of
(
1− 1e
)
γ(k) for IID buyers is deferred to
Appendix B. In the rest of the section, we prove Theorem 2. Let MOPT be a utility optimal BIC
mechanism with these two restrictions, and hOPT(·, ·, ·) be its payment function.
Overall Idea: Consider any soft randomized sequential mechanism M′ that processes buyers
independently (according to its payment function h′(·, ·, ·)), and matches MOPT for (a) the total
probability of each large payment summed over all buyers, (b) the total revenue from small payments
and (c) the utility from huge payments. Using techniques developed for DSIC mechanisms, we get
U(M′) ≥ (1− 1/e)OPT. However, converting such soft mechanism into a mechanism that strictly
satisfies the inventory constraint while maintaining truthfulness is not easy. In the case of DSIC
mechanisms, the buyers were arranged in a decreasing order of prices, noting that top-k is a sub-
modular function. Here, if we allocate items to buyers with top-k payments in a realization of M′,
then the mechanism is no longer truthful. Further, as first-k is not a sub-modular function, the
desired approximation guarantee cannot be proven if we process buyers according to a fixed order.
We get around this problem by constructing a mechanism with L → ∞ rounds, where in every
round, each buyer is processed independently w.p. 1/L. The revenue from each allocation in this
mechanism has an identical distribution. This helps to limit the loss caused by imposing strict
inventory constraints. We now describe our mechanism in detail.
The Mechanism: Our mechanism Mrounds consists of L → ∞ rounds and hrounds(·, ·, ·) is the
payment function associated with it. In each round, buyers arrive according to a predefined order.
When buyer i arrives, subject to availability of items, he is independently processed with probability
1
L as follows: if his reported valuation is v, then he is given an item w.p.
∑
j hrounds(i, j, v), and
whenever he is given an item, he makes a payment of pj w.p.
hrounds(i,j,v)∑
l hrounds(i,l,v)
. Once processed,
buyer i is not considered for any future rounds. Further, the payment function hrounds(·, ·, ·) satisfies
following properties:
(a)
∑
i,v,pj∈Psm pjhrounds(i, j, v)fi(v) =
∑
i,v,pj∈Psm pjhOPT(i, j, v)fi(v),
(b) for each pj ∈ Plg,
∑
i,v hrounds(i, j, v)fi(v) =
∑
i,v hOPT(i, j, v)fi(v),
(c)
∑
i,v,pj∈Phg U(pj)hrounds(i, j, v)fi(v) =
∑
i,v,pj∈Phg U(pj)hOPT(i, j, v)fi(v),
(d) for each i, v, v′,
∑
j Ui(v − pj)hrounds(i, j, v) ≥
∑
j Ui(v − pj)hrounds(i, j, v
′), and
(e)
∑
i,j,v hrounds(i, j, v)fi(v) ≤ k.
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We draw a parallel between the properties of hrounds(·, ·, ·) with the algorithm developed in the
case of DSIC mechanisms: the first three properties are equivalent to designing a mechanism that
matches MOPT in the total probability for each large payment, the expected revenue from small
payments and the expected utility from huge payments. The fourth constraint establishes the
truthfulness of Mrounds, and the last constraint ensures its feasibility in expectation. We further
note that Mrounds is truthful-in-expectation: conditioned on processing buyer i in some round, the
payment function ensures truthfulness in terms of his expected utility.
The following lemma bounds the utility of Mrounds, we defer its proof to later in the section.
Lemma 4.1 As L→∞, U (Mrounds) ≥ (1− ǫ)
(
1− 1e
)2
γ(k)OPT.
Algorithm: To construct an algorithm, we guess the total probability for each large payment (qj),
the utility from huge payments (H) and the revenue from the small payments (R). The feasibility
of a configuration can be checked using a covering LP; the details of the LP are given in the
appendix. There are 2poly(1/ǫ) configurations, and we select a feasible configuration with maximum
expected utility. Further, the number of rounds can be limited to O(n2) with a small loss in the
approximation factor. To establish our result, it remains to prove Lemma 4.1.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Let Icopies be an instance of the problem where each buyer is split into L
independent copies, the copies of buyer i are i1, i2, ..., iL, and the valuation for each copy is drawn
independently from Fi. Consider a mechanism Msoft on Icopies with L iterations. The lth copy
of every buyer is considered in the lth iteration; when buyer il arrives, Msoft discards him w.p.
(1 − 1/L), otherwise it processes him according to hrounds(i, ·, ·). In the following lemma, we lower
bound the utility of Msoft; its proof follows from Lemma 3.7 and Lemma 3.8.
Lemma 4.2 U(Msoft) ≥ (1− 1/e− ǫ)OPT.
To simplify notation, in the rest of the proof, we refer to the payment function of Msoft by h(·, ·, ·).
Further, let kexp =
∑
i,j,v hrounds(i, j, v)fi(v); note kexp ≤ k.
Observe that mechanismsMrounds andMsoft are equivalent with two exceptions: (a) hard inven-
tory constraint ofMrounds, and (b)Msoft can process more than one copy of a buyer in a realization.
We first address the issue of the inventory constraint. Using the correlation gap, we get that the
expected number of allocations in Msoft after first k allocations is at most kexp/e. This alone is not
sufficient to prove the lemma as U is not linear. We note a crucial property ofMsoft in Lemma 4.3,
it establishes that the revenue from any allocation in Msoft has an identical distribution. Let Di be
the distribution on the revenue from first i allocations in Msoft.
Lemma 4.3 As L→∞, we have PrXi:Di,Xi−1:Di−1 [(Xi −Xi−1) = pj] =
∑
i,v h(i,j,v)fi(v)
kexp
.
Proof: Let Yl be a random variable indicating the revenue made in round l. Clearly Yl and Yl′
have the same distribution for any l, l′ ≤ L. Furthermore, as L→∞, conditioned on one allocation
in an iteration, the probability of an additional allocation in the same iteration is (almost) 0. Thus
we get Pr [Yl = pj|Yl 6= 0] =
∑
i,v h(i,j,v)fi(v)
kexp . Conditioned on ith allocation happening in round l,
the probability that ith allocation has revenue pj, is exactly Pr [Yl = pj|Yl 6= 0]. This proves the
lemma.
Consider a new mechanism Mhard on Icopies that is identical to Msoft with an exception that it
stops after k allocations. We now bound its utility.
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Lemma 4.4 As L→∞, U(Mhard) ≥ γ(k)U(Msoft).
Proof: As payments are non-negative, using Lemma 4.3, we get Di  Dj for each i and j < i. The
contribution to the utility from the ith allocation in Msoft is
EX:Di,Y :Di−1 [U(X) −U(Y )] = EX:D1,Y :Di−1 [U(X + Y )−U(Y )]
Let Zi denote the above quantity. Using stochastic dominance of Di over Dj for every j < i and
Lemma 4.3, we get that Zi ≤ Zj for any j < i.
As the allocations in Msoft are independent, and the expected number of allocations in Msoft
after first k allocations can be bounded by kexp(1 − γ(k)). Let r1, r2, ..., rn be the probabilities of
1st, 2nd, ..., nth allocation in Msoft. We have ri ≥ r>i, thus we get
U(Mhard) =
∑
1≤i≤k riZi ≥ γ(k)
(∑
1≤i≤k riZi +
∑
k+1≤i≤n riZk
)
≥ γ(k)
(∑
1≤i≤n riZi
)
≥ γ(k)U(Msoft)
This proves the lemma.
To bound the utility of Mrounds, we need to address one more issue: Mhard can process more
than one copy of a buyer. Let Di1 be the distribution on the revenue from all copies of first i buyers
in Msoft. Let Di2 be the distribution on the revenue from first i buyers in Mrounds. As payments
are non-negative, we have Di1  Di2. Furthermore, for any fixed i, for each l, the distribution on
the revenue from the lth allocation among buyer i’s copies is same. The expected number of copies
of buyer i processed in Msoft is 1. Using correlation gap, the expected number of rounds in which
buyer i is processed in Mhard after first processing is 1/e. Using stochastic dominance of Di1 over
Di2, the expected loss in the utility can be bounded by a factor 1/e. This completes the proof. 2
Now we give an improved result when k ≥ 1/ǫ3. In a soft randomized sequential mechanism
with payment function same as Mrounds, if we discard each buyer independently w.p. ǫ, then w.p.
at least (1 − ǫ), we do not run out of items. The (1 − 1/e − O(ǫ))-approximation follows by the
following property of concave functions.
Lemma 4.5 Let X be a random variable that takes value between 0 and R for some R > 0. Then,
E [U(R−X)] ≥
(
1− E[X]R
)
(U(R)−U(0)) for any non-decreasing concave function U.
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A Omitted Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Lemma 3.1. It is obvious that Uk is monotone and symmetric. Let x = (x1, x2 . . . xn)
and y = (y1, y2 . . . yn), and let max{x, y} = (z1, z2 . . . zn) and min{x, y} = (z
′
1, z
′
2 . . . z
′
n), such that
∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, zi = xi, z
′
i = yi if xi ≥ yi, and zi = yi, z
′
i = xi if xi < yi. To show submodularity we
need to show that for any x, y
Uk(max{x, y}) +Uk(min{x, y}) ≤ Uk(x) +Uk(y)
Or equivalently, that for any x ≥ y (i.e. xi ≥ yi∀i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and t ≥ xi ≥ yi, if x ∧i t =
x1 . . . xi−1, t, xi+1 . . . and y ∧i t = y1 . . . yi−1, t, yi+1 . . ., then
Uk(x ∧i t)−Uk(x) ≤ Uk(y ∧i t)−Uk(y) .
We shall prove the latter statement. Let Ik(x) =
∑k
j=1maxj(x). It is easy to see that Ik(x ∧i
t)− Ik(x) = max {0, t−max{xi,maxk(x)}} ≤ max {0, t−max{yi,maxk(y)}} = Ik(y ∧i t) − Ik(y),
i.e. Ik itself is submodular. Also, Ik(x) ≥ Ik(y). The statement now follows from noting that
Uk(x) = U(Ik(x)), and that U(a+ b)−U(b) ≤ U(a
′ + b′)−U(b′) ∀a ≤ a′, b ≥ b′, for any concave
function U. 2
Proof of Lemma 3.5. The lemma follows from the fact that Uk is submodular – in fact, it applies
to any submodular function. Let {p1, p2, ..., pℓ} be the set of different non-zero values realized by
either X1 or X2 with non-zero probability. Let πi, π
′
i be the probabilities that X1 and X2 realize
to pi, respectively. Fix a realization of random variables in S\{X1,X2}, and let this realization be
denoted by zˆ; in this case, we shall express Uk(S) as Uk(X1,X2, zˆ) and Uk((S \ {X1,X2}) ∪ {Y })
as Uk(Y, zˆ).
E [Uk (Y, zˆ)]−E [Uk (X1,X2, zˆ)]
=
∑
i(πi + π
′
i)Uk(pi)−
∑
i
(
πi(1−
∑
j π
′
j) + π
′
i(1−
∑
j πj)
)
Uk(pi)−
∑
i,j πiπ
′
jUk(pi + pj)
=
∑
i
(
πi(
∑
j π
′
j) + π
′
i(
∑
j πj)
)
Uk(pi)−
∑
i,j πiπ
′
jUk(pi + pj)
=
∑
i,j πiπ
′
j (Uk(pi) +Uk(pj)−Uk(pi + pj)) ≥ 0
The last inequality follows from the definition of submodularity. Since the above inequality holds
for any zˆ, the lemma follows. 2
Proof of Lemma 3.6. This lemma holds for any monotone submodular function, including Uk.
If a variable Xi ∈ S is split into {Xi1,Xi2, ...,Xit}, then the realization of Xi can be simulated by∑
1≤j≤tXij with appropriate correlation among them. Thus with appropriate correlation among
the variables in S′, we can ensure that E [Uk(S′)] = E [Uk(S)]. When variables in S′ are made
independent, its expected utility is at least (1 − 1e )E [Uk(S)], by the correlation gap bound in
Lemma 3.2, since Uk is monotone and submodular. 2
Proof of Lemma 3.8. Our proof has 3 steps. Our first step is to separate the contribution of Shg
from the rest.
Claim 1 E [Uk(S)] is approximated within a factor of (1±O(ǫ)) by E [Uk(Ssm ∪ Slg)]+
∑
Xi∈Shg E [U(Xi)].
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Proof: It is easy to upper bound the expected utility: E [Uk(S)] ≤ E [Uk(Ssm ∪ Slg)]+E [Uk(Shg)] ≤
E [Uk(Ssm ∪ Slg)] +
∑
Xi∈Shg E [U(Xi)], since U is concave.
For the lower bound, note that Pr [Uk(Shg) > 0] ≤ ǫ, by Markov’s inequality, since Uk(Shg) > 0
implies Uk(S) ≥ E [Uk(S)]/ǫ. Further, the probability that some particular Xi ∈ Shg is non-zero,
while all other variables in Shg are zero, is at least πi(1− ǫ). So we have
E [Uk(S)] = E [Uk(S)−Uk(Shg)] +E [Uk(Shg)]
≥ Pr [Uk(Shg) = 0]E [Uk(Ssm ∪ Slg) | Uk(Shg) = 0] +E [Uk(Shg)]
≥ (1− ǫ)E [Uk(Ssm ∪ Slg)] +
∑
Xi∈Shg
πi(1− ǫ)U(pi)
= (1− ǫ)E [Uk(Ssm ∪ Slg)] + (1− ǫ)
∑
Xi∈Shg
E [U(Xi)]
Without loss of generality, we may assume that 1/ǫ is an integer. Our second step establishes
that for k > 1/ǫ4, one may simply assume that k =∞.
Claim 2 Let S′ = Ssm ∪ Slg. If k > 1/ǫ4, then (1 + ǫ)E [Uk(S′)] ≥ E
[
Uk(1+ǫ)(S
′)
]
≥ (1 −
ǫ)E [U(S′)].
Proof: The first inequality trivially follows from the definition of Uk, since (1 + ǫ)Uk(S
′) ≥
Uk(1+ǫ)(S
′) on every realization.
Since k > 1/ǫ4 and
∑
Xi∈S′ πi ≤ k, so the probability of the event that the number of non-zero
variables in a realization exceeds k(1 + ǫ), is at most ǫ. This follows directly from Chebyshev’s
inequality. Conditioned on this event, the expected contribution to U(S′) from variables that
are positive but does not contribute to Uk(1+ǫ)(S
′), is at most E [U(S′)]. This is because the
realizations of these excess positive variables is independent of the said event. So the difference
between E [U(S′)] and E
[
Uk(1+ǫ)(S
′)
]
is at most ǫE [U(S′)], hence the second inequality.
Our third claim, combined with the first claim, completes the proof of Lemma 3.8.
Claim 3 Let S′ = Ssm ∪ Slg. Then E [Uk(S′)] is approximated within a factor of (1 ± O(ǫ)) by
E
[
U
(
E [Ssm] +
∑
Xi∈Slg Xi
)]
.
Proof: Also, if k ≤ 1/ǫ4, then Ssm = ∅ by definition, so the claim is trivially true; so we assume
that k > 1/ǫ4. Then, by our second claim above, E [Uk(S
′)] is approximated within a factor
of (1 + 2ǫ) by E [U(S′)]. So it suffices to show that E [U(S′)] is approximated within a factor of
(1±O(ǫ)) by E
[
U
(
E [Ssm] +
∑
Xi∈Slg Xi
)]
. Again, the upper bound is easy to obtain: E [U(S′)] ≤
E
[
U
(
E [Ssm] +
∑
Xi∈Slg Xi
)]
by concavity of U.
For the lower bound, let us first consider the case that E [Ssm] ≥ p
∗/ǫ3. Then Var[Ssm] ≤
ǫ3E [Ssm], since Xi < p
∗ for all Xi ∈ Ssm. Then by Chebyshev’s inequality, we have
∑
Xi∈Ssm Xi >
(1− ǫ)E [Ssm] with probability at least 1− ǫ. So
E
[
U(S′)
]
≥ (1− ǫ)E

U

(1− ǫ)E [Ssm] + ∑
Xi∈Slg
Xi



 ≥ (1− 2ǫ)E

U

E [Ssm] + ∑
Xi∈Slg
Xi



 .
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Now let us assume that E [Ssm] < p
∗/ǫ3. In this case, we show below that
E
[
U(S′)
]
≤ E

U

E [Ssm] + ∑
Xi∈Slg
Xi



 ≤ (1 +O(ǫ))E [U(Slg)] ≤ (1 +O(ǫ))E [U(S′)] .
Note that with probability at least (1−ǫ), the number of non-zero variables in Slg is at least (1−ǫ)/ǫ4
(by Chebyshev’s inequality on the indicator variables of Xi), which implies that
∑
Xi∈Slg Xi ≥
(1 − ǫ)p∗/ǫ4 – let this event be denoted by A, so that Pr [A] ≥ (1 − ǫ), and let A¯ denote the
complementary event. Let E [Ssm] = Rsm.
E

U

Rsm + ∑
Xi∈Slg
Xi

−U(Slg)


= E

U

Rsm + ∑
Xi∈Slg
Xi

−U(Slg) | A

Pr [A] +E

U

Rsm + ∑
Xi∈Slg
Xi

−U(Slg) | A¯

(1−Pr [A])
≤ (1− ǫ)
(
U
(
Rsm +
(1 − ǫ)p∗
ǫ4
)
−U
(
(1− ǫ)p∗
ǫ4
))
+ ǫ (U(Rsm + 0)−U(0))
≤ (1− ǫ)
ǫ4Rsm
(1 − ǫ)p∗
U
(
(1− ǫ)p∗
ǫ4
)
+ ǫU(Rsm)
≤ ǫU
(
(1− ǫ)p∗
ǫ4
)
+ ǫU
(
p∗
ǫ3
)
≤ 2ǫU
(
(1− ǫ)p∗
ǫ4
)
Both the first and second inequalities follow from concavity of U, while the last inequality holds
for ǫ ≤ 12 . Finally, observe that E [U(Slg)] ≥ (1− ǫ)U
(
(1−ǫ)p∗
ǫ4
)
. 2
A.1 Detailed Algorithm for the DSIC Mechanism
From Lemma 3.4, it suffices to guess (a) the threshold p∗ separating large and small prices, (b) the
total probability of sale qk for each large price pk, (c) the expected revenue from small prices R,
and (d) the expected contribution to utility, say h, from huge prices. The large prices (and hence
the threshold p∗ as well) can be discretized so that they come only from the set U−1(ǫ5tOPT) for
any integer 0 ≤ t ≤ 1ǫ6 . This is because the loss in utility due to discretization, in every realization,
is at most ǫ5OPT per sale at a large price. This is immediate if the large price sale is the first
sale to occur in the realization, and concavity implies that the loss can only be smaller if some
revenue has already been collected in the realization. So the total loss in expected utility due to
this discretization is at most ǫ5OPT times the expected number of large prices sales. Since there
are O( 1
ǫ4
) large price sales in expectation, the loss is O(ǫOPT).
Similarly, h and U(R) can be guessed up to a multiple of ǫOPT. We shall guess the total sale
probability for each large price to the nearest multiple of ǫ8. The total error over all price buckets
is less than ǫ2 and so the loss in the utility due to rounding of the probability masses is bounded
by ǫOPT. All these guesses define a configuration. The number of configurations is bounded by
2poly(1/ǫ). For each configuration we check if there exists an SPM satisfying the configuration, using
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the covering linear program (LP) below. In this, the variable xij denotes the probability that buyer
i is offered price pj. ∑
i (1− Fi(pj)) xij ≥ qj ∀pj ∈ Plg∑
i,pj∈Psm (1− Fi(pj)) pjxij ≥ R∑
i,pj∈Phg (1− Fi(pj))U(pj)xij ≥ H∑
i,j (1− Fi(pj)) xij ≤ k∑
j xij ≤ 1 ∀j
xij ∈ [0, 1] ∀i, j
Any feasible solution to this linear program gives a distribution of prices for each buyer, which gives
us an SPM that satisfies the guessed configuration. For the configuration that matches MOPT, any
feasible solution of the program gives an SPM that is a (1 − 1/e − ǫ)-approximation. So our
algorithm is to iterate through all the configurations, generate at most one randomized SPM for
each configuration, and then simulate them to find out, with high confidence, the best among these
SPMs.
B BIC Mechanisms for a Risk Averse Seller and Risk Averse IID
Buyers
In this section, we consider the problem of designing a BIC mechanism for a risk averse seller when
buyers are risk averse, each buyer’s valuation is drawn IID from a known distribution F and their
utility functions U are identical. The following theorem summarizes our result in this setting.
Theorem 3 There exists a polynomial time algorithm to compute a truthful-in-expectation mecha-
nism with expected utility (1− ǫ)
(
1− 1e
)
γ(k)OPT, where OPT is the expected utility of the optimal
BIC mechanism.
In the rest of the section, we prove Theorem 3. We call a mechanism to be symmetric if, for all
i 6= i′, j, v, we have h(i, j, v) = h(i′, j, v). We first establish an important property of symmetric
mechanisms in the following lemma.
Lemma B.1 There exists a utility optimal BIC mechanism that is symmetric for all buyers.
Proof: If the optimal BIC mechanism MOPT is not symmetric, then consider a new mechanism
M′ that for every set of reported bids, renames buyers randomly, and runs MOPT on the these
bids. Clearly U(MOPT) = U(M
′). To prove the lemma, it suffices to establish that M′ is a BIC
mechanism. Fix any buyer i, his utility in M′ for reporting his true valuation v is
1
n

∑
j,l
(U(v − pj)h(l, j, v))


and his utility when he reports v′ instead of true valuation v is
1
n

∑
j,l
(
U(v − pj)h(l, j, v
′)
)
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From the incentive compatibility property of MOPT, we get∑
j
(U(v − pj)h(l, j, v)) ≥
∑
j
(
U(v − pj)h(l, j, v
′)
)
for every l. Summing over l proves the lemma.
So from here onwards, we can assume that MOPT is symmetric; in the optimal mechanism,
let h(j, v) be the probability that the buyer gets an item for payment pj when his valuation is v.
Thus the revenue of MOPT can be represented using the sum of identical (and correlated) random
variables X1,X2, ...,Xn, where for each i, Pr[Xi = pj] =
∑
v h(j, v)f(v). Let X
′
1,X
′
2, ...,X
′
n be a set
of random variables such that the marginal distribution of Xi and X
′
i is same for each i. Let Msoft
be a soft randomized sequential mechanism whose allocation and payment functions are same as
MOPT. Using correlation gap, we get
U (Msoft) = E
[
U
(∑
i
X ′i
)]
≥
(
1−
1
e
)
OPT
Let M be the mechanism obtained by applying the inventory constraint on Msoft, i.e. it stops
when items run out. We note that M is still a BIC mechanism: even though the probability of
allocations and payments for a buyer for valuation v is not same in Msoft and M, these values
remain same conditioned on reaching a buyer without running out of inventory. We now bound
the expected utility of M in the following lemma, its proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 4.4.
Lemma B.2 U (M) ≥ γ(k)Msoft.
Thus it suffices to guess the values h(j, v) for each j, v to compute a (1 − 1/e)2-approximate
mechanism. However such algorithm will require exponential time. We need the following lemma
to get a polynomial time algorithm.
Lemma B.3 Consider two randomized and symmetric sequential pricing mechanism M1 and M2
with inventory constraint of k, and let h1(v, j) and h2(v, j) be their payment functions, such that
(a)
∑
v,pj∈Psm pjh1(j, v)f(v) =
∑
v,pj∈Psm pjh2(j, v)f(v), (b) for each pj ∈ Plg,
∑
v h1(j, v)f(v) =∑
v h2(j, v)f(v), and (c)
∑
v,pj∈Phg U(pj)h1(j, v)f(v) =
∑
v,pj∈Phg U(pj)h2(j, v)f(v).
Its proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 3.4. We note an important step in the proof: if two
symmetric mechanisms have the same probability for each payment, then the revenue distribution
per buyer remains same, and we do not lose a factor of (1− 1/e) in the approximation ratio during
the split-and-merge operation.
Thus per buyer values of probability for each large payment (qj), the utility from huge payments
(H) and the revenue from the small payments (R); the feasibility of a configuration can be checked
using an LP.
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C Omitted Details from Section 4
BIC Mechanisms for a Risk Averse Sellers: LP to check the feasibility of a configura-
tion ∑
j Ui(v − pj)hrounds(i, j, v) ≥
∑
j Ui(v − pj)hrounds(i, j, v
′) ∀i, v, v′∑
i,v hrounds(i, j, v)fi(v) ≥ qj ∀pj ∈ Plg∑
v,pj∈Psm pjfi(v)hrounds(i, j, v) ≥ R∑
v,pj∈Phg U(pj)fi(v)hrounds(i, j, v) ≥ H∑
i,j,v hrounds(i, j, v)fi(v) ≤ k∑
j hrounds(i, j, v) = 1 ∀i, v
hrounds(i, j, v) ∈ [0, 1] ∀i, j, v
D Mechanisms for a Risk Neutral Seller and Risk Averse Buyers
In this section, we design mechanisms for a risk neutral seller when buyers are risk averse. The
following theorem summarizes our result; it shows that (a) optimal BIC mechanism can be designed
for risk averse seller and (b) the gap between an optimal truthful-in-expectation and an optimal
BIC mechanisms is bounded by γ(k).
Theorem 4 Given risk averse buyers and a risk neutral seller, let OPT be the expected revenue
of the optimal BIC mechanism. Then (a) there exists a polynomial time algorithm to compute a
truthful-in-expectation mechanism with expected revenue γ(k)OPT, and (b) there exists a polynomial
time algorithm to compute a BIC mechanism with expected revenue OPT.
Proof: We begin by proving the first part of the theorem. We note that the objective of the
following LP is at least OPT. The first constraint in the LP ensures that the mechanism is truthful,
the second constraint ensures that exactly one allocation-payment event realizes in expectation for
a buyer’s bid, and the third constraint is the inventory constraint.
Maximize
∑
i,j,v
(g(i, j, v)pjfi(v) + h(i, j, v)pjfi(v))
∑
j (Ui(v − pj)h(i, j, v) + Ui(−pj)g(i, j, v)) ≥
∑
j (Ui(v − pj)h(i, j, v
′) + Ui(−pj)g(i, j, v′)) ∀i, v, v′∑
j (h(i, j, v) + g(i, j, v)) = 1 ∀i, v∑
i,j,v h(i, j, v)fi(v) ≤ k
h(i, j, v), g(i, j, v) ∈ [0, 1] ∀i, j, v
We construct a mechanism from the LP solution using Algorithm 1. We note that the mechanism is
truthful-in-expectation: the position of buyer i in the sequence is independent of his valuation, and
conditioned on reaching him without running out of items, he allocation and payment probabilities
are equal to the LP solution. We now establish the approximation bound.
For the purpose of analysis, we replace the payment from buyer i with a deterministic quantity
paymenti =
∑
j,v (g(i, j, v)pjfi(v) + h(i, j, v)pjfi(v)). Let probi =
∑
j,v (g(i, j, v)fi(v) + h(i, j, v)fi(v)),
i.e. the probability of allocation to buyer i. Further, let kexp =
∑
i,j,v h(i, j, v)fi(v). W.l.o.g., as-
sume that the mechanism processes buyers in order 1, 2, 3, ..., n. Let ri be the probability that k
items are allocated before buyer i arrives. We have r1 ≤ r2 ≤ .... ≤ rn, and∑
i
ri × probi ≤ (1− γ(k)) × k
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Algorithm 1 Truthful in Expectation Mechanism for a Risk Neutral Seller and Risk Averse Buyers
.
Arrange the buyers in the decreasing order of
∑
j,v(g(i,j,v)pjfi(v)+h(i,j,v)pjfi(v))∑
j,v(g(i,j,v)fi(v)+h(i,j,v)fi(v))
.
for each buyer i in the sequence do
if there is at least one item remaining then
Ask buyer i for his valuation. Let v be his reported valuation.
Allocated an item to him w.p.
∑
j h(i, j, v), and he makes a payment of pj w.p.
h(i,j,v)∑
l h(i,l,v)
in
this case. When he is not given an item, he makes a payment of pj w.p.
g(i,j,v)∑
l g(i,l,v)
.
end if
end for
Let ti =
paymenti
probi
. We get t1 ≥ t2 ≥ ... ≥ tn. The revenue of the mechanism is
∑
i
(1− ri)× paymenti
=
∑
i
(1− ri)× ti × probi
≥ γ(k)
∑
i
paymenti
where the last inequality follows using t1 ≥ t2 ≥ ... ≥ tn, and
∑
i ri × probi ≤ (1− γ(k))× k. This
completes the proof of the first claim.
Now we consider the second part of the theorem. Its proof is similar to the first part; we consider
an LP as earlier, however we also add a separation oracle for the Border’s inequality; [3] show that
such separation oracle can be designed in polynomial time. The constructive proof of the Border’s
inequality also gives a way of allocating items to buyers based on their valuations honouring supply
constraints. When an item is allocated to buyer i, then he is charged pj w.p.
h(i,j,v)∑
j h(i,j,v)
. Similarly,
when he is not allocated an item, he pays pj w.p.
g(i,j,v)∑
j g(i,j,v)
. Thus the payment functions of a buyer
can be implemented exactly.
E DSIC Mechanisms for Risk Averse Sellers: Unit Demand Buy-
ers
In this section, we consider the problem of designing DSIC mechanisms for a risk averse sellers in
a multi-parameter settings where buyers are unit-demand. We are able to combine our techniques
with a recent approximation result for revenue maximization for the unit-demand problem, when
there are multiple distinct items. We note that for such multi-parameter settings, no characteri-
zation of an optimal mechanism is known even for the expected revenue objective. This gives our
second result.
Theorem 5 For unit-demand setting with multiple distinct items, there is a poly-time computable
randomized order-independent sequential posted price mechanism with expected utility at least
(
1−1/e
6.75 − ǫ
)
OPT,
for any ǫ > 0, where OPT is the expected utility of an optimal DSIC mechanism.
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Our obtain our result by combining our tools for handling risk aversion with a recent result of
Chawla et. al. [6], who gave a 16.75 -approximation to this problem for the expected revenue objective.
The approximation factor has since been improved to 14 for expected revenue, by Alaei [2]. To
the best of our knowledge, our algorithm gives the first non-trivial approximation guarantee for
maximizing expected (concave) utility in any multi-parameter setting.
In the rest of the section, we prove Theorem 5. We will reduce the problem of designing a
mechanism for any instance I of a unit-demand setting with n buyers and m items to finding a
special type of mechanism for an instance I ′ of a single parameter setting with matrix feasibility
constraint. Matrix feasibility constraint is defined as follows: there are mn buyers arranged in an
n ×m matrix, and the seller can serve at most one buyer from each row and at most one buyer
from each column. There is a natural mapping between the two instances: split buyer i ∈ I into
m independent buyers i1, i2, ..., im and the distribution on the valuation of buyer ij is same as
the distribution of buyer i’s valuation for item j. Clearly any feasible assignment of items in I
corresponds to a feasible assignment of items in I ′ and vice versa.
We define a class of pricing mechanisms, called partially order-oblivious posted pricing (partial-
OPM), for the single parameter setting with matrix constraint: the mechanism specifies an ordering
σ on the rows on the matrix, along with independent price distributions for all buyers. All buyers in
row σ(i) (ith row in the sequence) of the matrix arrive before any buyer in row σ(i+1); however, the
order of buyers in each row σ(i) is chosen adversarially, where the adversary knows the valuation of
buyers and the mechanism’s prices and wishes to minimize the utility obtained. Partial-OPM in I ′
can be mapped naturally to an SPM for I: buyers arrive in the order specified by σ, and if buyer ij
was offered a price of x in I ′, then buyer i is offered item j at a price x (if item j is available when
buyer i arrives). The following lemma describes the relation between these two types of problems.
Lemma E.1 Given a unit-demand instance I and its corresponding single-parameter instance I ′
as defined above, if OPT and OPT′ are the optimal expected utilities for I and I ′ respectively, then
OPT′ ≥ OPT. Furthermore, given any partial-OPM for I ′, there is a poly-time computable SPM
for I with expected utility at least as much as the expected utility of the partial-OPM for I ′.
Proof: The scheme for designing an approximate utility-optimal mechanism mirrors the scheme
for designing approximately revenue-optimal mechanism in [6], as follows. Fix any utility optimal
deterministic mechanismMOPT for I. Note that, any deterministic truthful multi-parameter mech-
anism for unit demand buyers can be interpreted as offering a price menu with one price for each
item/service to each buyer as a function of other buyers’ bids [15]. We construct a corresponding
mechanism M′ on I ′ that has the same allocation function as in [6]. In every realization of the
bid vector, the revenue in M′ is at least as large as the revenue in MOPT. Thus the utility of the
former is at least the utility of the latter. So the optimal expected utility on I ′ is at least as much
as the optimal expected utility on I.
Next, similar to [6], we show that we can use a partial-OPM M′ for I ′ to construct an item
pricing mechanism M for I. Order the buyers in I as per the order of rows of matrix in M′,
and fix a realization of buyers’ valuations and prices in M′. In the corresponding realization in I,
when buyer i ∈ I arrives, he is shown the set of available items and the price asked for item j is
the price asked for buyer ij ∈ I ′. As the buyer i chooses the item that maximizes his utility, the
revenue from buyer i is no less than the revenue from buyers in row i in I ′ (since the mechanism
in I ′ is order-oblivious within a row). Thus the revenue obtained in M is at least the minimum
revenue (among all orderings of buyers within each row) in M′, for every realization of prices and
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valuations. Hence the expected utility of M is at least as much as the expected utility of M′.This
completes the proof of the lemma.
It is worth noting that Lemma E.1 deviates from the reduction used by Chawla et. al. [6] from
unit-demand setting to a single-parameter setting for expected revenue in the following manner:
Chawla et. al. [6] computed a completely order-oblivious posted pricing (where even buyers in
different rows can be intermingled adversarially) for I ′, which yields a completely order-oblivious
posted pricing for I. This implication remains true for utility as well. However, we are not able to
analyze the performance of a complete OPM in the case of expected utility; instead, we are able to
compute a partial-OPM with a good approximation guarantee on expected utility in I ′. As will be
clear below, the only part where we need to restrict ourselves to partial-OPMs is Lemma E.3. Its
analogue for revenue holds even for complete OPMs by a simple application of Markov’s inequality
[6], but the proof is more complicated for utility maximization.
In the rest of the section, we prove the following theorem, which combined with Lemma E.1
implies Theorem 5.
Theorem 6 For the single parameter setting with matrix feasibility constraint, there is a polyno-
mial time algorithm to compute a partial-OPM with a given ordering among the rows and expected
utility
(
1−1/e
6.75 − ǫ
)
OPT. Furthermore, the price distributions computed by the algorithm yields this
guarantee for any ordering σ among the rows.
Let MOPT be an optimal deterministic truthful mechanism for a single-parameter instance with
matrix constraint, so by incentive compatibility, every buyer is offered a price as a function of other
buyers’ bids. Let P = {p1, p2, . . .} be the set of distinct prices offered in any mechanism. Let πijk
be the probability that buyer ij is offered price pk in MOPTs. We note the important properties
of prices in MOPT: (a)
∑
j,k πijk (1− Fij(pk)) ≤ 1 ∀i (at most one buyer is served from the i
th
row), (b)
∑
i,k πijk (1− Fij(pk)) ≤ 1 ∀j (at most one buyer is served from the j
th column), and (c)∑
k πijk ≤ 1 ∀i, j (buyer ij is offered only one price in every realization).
We define soft-OPM as a type of posted pricing mechanism, where (a) the prices for buyers are
drawn independently, (b) it allocates items to all buyers who have valuations above their respective
offered prices, and (c) satisfies feasibility constraints in expectation but not in every realization. In
other words, a soft-OPM sets prices so that it sells to at most one buyer in expectation in each
column and in each row. It is obvious that the utility obtained by a soft-OPM is independent of
the arrival order of buyers, and the revenue from a buyer is independent of past or future events
in a realization of the mechanism.
We note an important property of soft-OPMs in the following lemma. It enables the redistri-
bution of probability mass for any given price across buyers, and makes it sufficient to guess the
total sale probability at each price. It is the analogue of Lemma 3.7 for multi-unit auctions. Its
proof is practically identical to that of Lemma 3.7 – it applies a series of split operations followed
by a series of merge operations to transform an optimal mechanism to a given soft-OPM. The only
difference is that the submodular function in this case is U∞ instead of Uk, that is, there is no
explicit bound on the inventory. So we skip the proof of this lemma.
Lemma E.2 Consider any soft-OPM M1, that offers price pk ∈ P with probability π
′
ijk, and
satisfies the following condition:
∑
i,j π
′
ijk(1 − F (pk)) =
∑
i,j πijk(1 − F (pk)) = qk, ∀pk ∈ P (for
every price, the total sale probability, i.e. the sale probabilities summed over all buyers, at a given
price in M1 is the same as that in MOPT). Then U(M1) ≥ (1−
1
e )OPT.
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Algorithm: We shall design a polynomial time algorithm to compute a soft-OPM M1 such that
U(M1) ≥ (1 −
1
e − O(ǫ))OPT. We shall then construct a partial-OPM M2 from M1, as follows:
if buyer ij is offered price pk w.p. π
′
ijk in M1, then M2 offers price pk to ij w.p. π
′
ijk/3 and a
price of∞ with the remaining probability (provided that serving buyer ij will not violate feasibility
of matrix constraint). Lemma E.3 below implies that M2 gives us the required guarantee, so it
only remains to design an algorithm to compute a soft-OPM. To compare our result with the
1/6.75-approximation for expected revenue [6], one may note that for linear utility, a reduction to
soft-OPM such as Lemma E.2 holds quite easily without losing a factor of (1 − 1e ), while Lemma
E.3 naturally remains true (moreover, it even holds for complete OPMs).
Lemma E.3 For any soft-OPM M1, if we construct a partial-OPM M2 from M1 as above, then
U(M2) ≥ U(M1)/6.75 for any ordering among the rows.
Proof: We first note that a soft-OPMM3 that offers price pk to buyer ij w.p. π
′
ijk/3 has expected
utility U(M3) ≥ U(M1)/3 since U is concave. We shall now show that U(M2) ≥
4
9U(M3).
Given an order σ on the rows of the matrix, consider an arbitrary buyer ij. Fix a realization
of prices and valuations (p,v) of all buyers that belong to rows σ(k) for k < σ−1(i) (buyers from
previous rows than row i according to σ), other than buyers belonging to column j, let this be
event Ep,v. We define event E
′
p,v as the event where Ep,v occurs, and in addition, and in the set
of buyers that arrive before ij, no buyer from the ith row or jth column has enough valuation to
accept its offered price. If E′p,v occurs, then the seller will definitely be able to sell to buyer ij if
the latter can accept the offered price.
We note that in event E′p,v, the revenue generated by M2 from all buyers that come before ij
is a fixed value, let it be Rp,v. This is because the valuations and prices for all buyers that come
before ij, other than those in row i and column j, are fixed, and there is no sale in row i and
column j until buyer ij arrives. Let Xp,v be a random variable indicating the revenue generated
by M3 in event Ep,v before buyer ij arrives. As M3 is a soft-OPM, every sale that happens in
M2 in event E
′
p,v also happens in M3 in event Ep,v. So we get Xp,v ≥ Rp,v in every realization.
The probability that no buyer in the ith row, except perhaps ij, has a valuation exceeding its
offered price, is at least 2/3, by Markov’s inequality. The same holds for the jth column. Moreover,
since these two events are independent, we get that Pr
[
E′p,v
]
≥
4Pr[Ep,v]
9 .
Let Rij be a random variable that indicates the revenue from buyer ij in M3. We note that
Rij is independent of Ep,v. The revenue from ij inM2 has same distribution as Rij in event E
′
p,v,
and it is 0 otherwise. The contribution to utility of buyer ij in M3 is∑
p,v (U(Rij +Xp,v)−U(Xp,v))Pr [Ep,v]. The contribution to utility of buyer ij in M2 is∑
p,v (U(Rij +Rp,v)−U(Rp,v))Pr
[
E′p,v
]
. Since U is concave, so in every realization,
(U(Rij +Rp,v)−U(Rp,v)) ≥ (U(Rij +Xp,v)−U(Xp,v))
So buyer ij’s contribution to utility inM2 is at least 4/9 times his contribution inM3. Summing
over contributions of all buyers in every event, we get that U(M2) ≥
4
9U(M3).
Algorithm to compute soft-OPM: It is similar to the algorithm designed for computing SPM
for k-unit auction.
We divide the prices in MOPT into 3 classes, small, large and huge. Let Phg be the set of huge
prices pk ≥ U
−1(OPT/ǫ). The distinction between small and large prices depend more intricately
on the optimal mechanism. Let p∗ be the largest price such that
∑
U−1(OPT/ǫ)>pk≥p∗ qk ≥ 1/ǫ
4,
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i.e. the threshold where the total sale probability of all large prices add up to at least 1/ǫ4. If
such a threshold does not exist, then let p∗ = 0. Let Psm be all prices less than p∗, so that
Plg = {pk | U
−1(OPT/ǫ) > pk ≥ p∗}. Now, using Lemma 3.8 in the proof of Lemma E.2 allows us
to prove the following variant of Lemma E.2. The proof of Lemma E.4 is practically identical to
that of Lemma 3.4, so we omit it.
Lemma E.4 Consider any soft-OPM M1, that offers price pk to buyer ij w.p. π
′
ijk, such that (a)∑
i,j,pk∈Psm pkπ
′
ijk(1 − Fij(pk)) =
∑
pk∈Psm pkqk, (b) for each pk ∈ Plg,
∑
i,j π
′
ijk(1 − Fij(pk)) = qk,
and (c)
∑
i,j,pk∈Phg U(pk)π
′
ijk(1 − Fij(pk)) =
∑
pk∈Phg U(pk)qk. Then we have U(M1) ≥ (1 −
1
e −
O(ǫ))OPT.
Thus it suffices to guess (a) the threshold p∗ separating large and small prices, (b) the total
probability of sale qk for each large price pk, (c) the expected revenue from small prices R, and
(d) the expected contribution to utility, say h, from huge prices. Just as in the case of multi-unit
auctions, the large prices (and hence the threshold p∗ as well) can be discretized so that they
come only from the set U−1(ǫ5tOPT) for any integer 0 ≤ t ≤ 1ǫ6 . Similarly, h and U(R) can be
guessed up to a multiple of ǫOPT, and the total sale probability for each large price to the nearest
multiple of ǫ8. All these guesses define a configuration. The number of configurations is bounded
by 2poly(1/ǫ).
∑
i,j (1− Fij(pk))xijk ≥ qk ∀pk ∈ Plg∑
i,j,pk∈Psm (1− Fij(pk)) pkxijk ≥ R∑
i,j,pk∈Phg (1− Fij(pk))U(pk)xijk ≥ h∑
i,k (1− Fij(pk))xijk ≤ 1 ∀j∑
j,k (1− Fij(pk))xijk ≤ 1 ∀i∑
k xijk ≤ 1 ∀i, j
xijk ≥ 0 ∀i, j, k
In the above LP, the variable xijk denotes the probability that buyer ij is shown price pk. Each
feasible configuration gives us a soft-OPM and we select the one with maximum utility.
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